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Abstract 
The enactment of the Charities Act 2006 in November 2006 introduced the first 
statutory definition of charity into English and Welsh law. Under the provisions of the 
Act, charitable status requires that an institution must be established for charitable 
purposes only and that the charitable purposes must be of public benefit.  Although, 
generally, well received the Charities Act 2006 has been criticised as ‘flawed’ on the 
public benefit requirement of charitable purposes.  
 
The Charities Act 2006 was passed with the principle aim of modernising existing 
charity law, which was considered outdated and unclear. However, unlike charitable 
purposes, which are set down within the provisions of the Act, a definition of public 
benefit is not provided. Section 3(3) of the Charities Act 2006 merely provides that 
‘reference to public benefit is a reference to the public benefit as that term is 
understood for the purposes of the law relating to charities in England and Wales’. 
This lack of a definition as to what constitutes public benefit and statutory reliance 
upon the charities’ regulator, the Charity Commission, to interpret and provide 
guidance on the public benefit requirement for charitable purposes has led to 
criticism that the Charities Act 2006 has raised as many uncertainties as it sought to 
clarify. 
In critically evaluating the impact of the Charities Act 2006, and its successor, the 
Charities Act 2011, upon English charity law, this assessment places the legal 
definition of charity within its complex and, at times, vague historical context. Thus, 
providing an ideal backdrop in which to explore the policy objectives behind the 
Charities Acts and assess the effectiveness of the Charities Acts in achieving those 
objectives. 
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Charitable trusts have a long history within English society, the oldest being King’s 
School, Canterbury, established in 597.1 
 
Today, charities are considered to be at the heart of UK society,2 with nearly £10 
billion in donations being given in 2011/123 and approximately 25 charity status 
applications being made to the Charity Commission4 every working day.5 In the 
financial year 2013/14, the Charity Commission received 6,661 applications for new 
charities in England and Wales, a 16 percent rise on the previous year.6 
 
Charitable trusts have a number of advantages over other forms of express trust, 
including exemption from formalities such as certainty of object7 and the rule against 
perpetuity.8 Unlike other forms of purpose trusts, which are generally void for lack of 
ascertainable beneficiaries,9 the Attorney General can legally enforce charitable 
trusts.10 
 
Charities also enjoy considerable tax advantages,11 including exemption from 
income tax and capital gains tax,12 and at least 80 percent relief on non-domestic 
rates.13 In addition, donations to charities may fall within the Gift Aid scheme, which 
provides substantial income tax advantages when the donor is a British taxpayer, as 
the scheme allows charities to reclaim the basic rate of tax on the gross equivalent of 
the gift.14 
 
Undoubtedly, these generous tax advantages are a significant motivation for seeking 
charitable status,15 with the Inland Revenue bringing many of the cases challenging 
the charitable status of trusts.16 Indeed, it is purported17 that the public benefit 
requirement for charitable purposes developed as a means of determining whether 
charitable status was being sought to obtain the tax advantages afforded to charities, 
for what are, essentially, trusts for private classes of beneficiaries.18 
 
Charity law reformed 
Historically, English charity law developed through the courts and the process of 
reasoning by analogy.19 However, on 8 November 2006, following recommendations 
by the Cabinet Office’s Strategy Unit,20 Parliament passed the Charities Act 2006 
(CA 2006), with the aim of reducing bureaucracy and modernising existing charity 
law by providing ‘greater clarity and a stronger emphasis on the delivery of public 
benefit’.21 The CA 2006 was consolidated into the Charities Act 2011 (CA 2011) on 
14 March 2012. 
 
Under the provisions of the CA 2011, a charitable trust must be created exclusively 
for charitable purposes.22 The charitable purpose must be legally recognised23 and 
must be of public benefit.24 However, unlike charitable purposes, which are set down 
within the provisions of s 3(1)(a)–(m) CA 2011,25 the 2011 Act does not provide a 
definition of public benefit. Section 4(3) CA 201126 merely provides that ‘reference to 
public benefit is a reference to the public benefit as that term is understood for the 
purposes of the law relating to charities in England and Wales’. 
 
The lack of a definition as to what constitutes public benefit and statutory reliance on 
the charities regulator, the Charity Commission, to interpret and provide guidance on 
 the public benefit requirements for charitable purposes27 has led to major criticism of 
the Charities Acts.28 
 
Assessment of just how successful the Charities Acts have been in modernising 
English charity law, by providing ‘greater clarity and stronger emphasis on public 
benefit’, 29 effectively requires the statutory definition of ‘charity’ or, more precisely, of 
‘charitable purposes’, to be placed within its historical context. 
 
Charitable purposes 
The legal definition of charitable purposes was originally set down in the preamble to 
the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601).30 Despite being over 400 years old, the 
preamble has formed the basis for the development of English charity law.31 
 
In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Pemsel,32Lord Macnaghten grouped the 
charitable purposes within the preamble to the1601 statute under four headings: 
 
Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief 
of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the 
advancement of religion; and trusts for purposes beneficial to the community, 
not falling under any of the proceeding heads.33 
 
Macnaghten’s classification of charitable purposes has been expanded under s 3(1) 
CA 201134 to include nine additional headings, thus codifying the development of 
charity law under Macnaghten’s fourth heading, trusts for purposes beneficial to the 
community. 
 
Noticeably, s 3(1)(m) CA 201135 preserves any other purpose recognised as 
charitable under existing law,36 whilst protecting the development of charitable 
purposes by analogy.37 Thus, allowing charity law to continue to develop in response 
to changes in society and public attitudes; thereby reflecting the spirit and intention 
behind the preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) and Macnaghten’s 
fourth heading, trusts for purposes beneficial to the community. 
 
As Lord Wilberforce noted in Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society v 
Glasgow City Corporation,38 ‘the law of charity is a moving subject which evolves 
over time’.39 Similarly, in National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners,40 Lord Simonds observed that ‘[a] purpose regarded in one age as 
charitable may in another be regarded differently’.41 
 
Where a trust is created for purposes other than those that are charitable, the trust 
will fail,42 unless the non-charitable purpose is merely ancillary or incidental to the 
main charitable purpose.43 This distinction was highlighted in McGovern v Attorney 
General:44 
 
The distinction is between (a) those non-charitable activities authorised by the 
trust instrument which are merely incidental or subsidiary to a charitable 
purpose and (b) those non-charitable activities so authorised which 
themselves form part of the trust purpose. In the latter but not the former 
case, the reference to non-charitable activities will deprive the trust of its 
charitable status.45 
  
Political purposes will cause a trust to fail, even where the purposes are stated as 
being for the public benefit,46 as it is not within the court’s competence to decide 
whether or not the legal changes being sought would be beneficial to the public.47 
The courts must assume the law to be correct.48 However, political discussions49 or 
political objects subsidiary to the main charitable purpose50 do not fall foul of the 
prohibition on political purposes. 
 
Since the enactment of the Equalities Act 2010 (EA 2010) in October 2010, it may be 
unlawful for trust purposes to discriminate on the grounds of protected 
characteristics.51 Where the EA 2010 does not make it unlawful to establish a charity 
that discriminates on the grounds of protected characteristics, but the Charity 
Commission considers it unlikely that the purpose can be administered in 
accordance with the EA 2010 provisions, the trust purpose will be held not to be in 
the public benefit, and thus, not charitable.52 
 
Public benefit 
The requirement that a trust purpose has to be of public benefit to be charitable is 
provided under s 2(1)(b) CA 2011.53 The CA 2011, however, falls short of providing a 
statutory definition of public benefit. Instead, the public benefit requirement is 
determined on the operation of existing case law,54 which has developed two 
identifiable aspects to the meaning of public benefit, both of which must be 
satisfied.55 
 
The ‘benefit’ aspect 
The benefit aspect requires that the charitable purpose must ‘benefit’ the public, or a 
section of the public.56 The benefit must be identifiable and must relate to the 
charitable purpose.57 Any detriment or harm that may result from the purpose must 
not outweigh the benefit.58 
 
In National Anti-Vivisection Society Lord Simonds states: 
 
Where on the evidence before it the court concludes that, however well 
intentioned the donor, the achievement of his object will be greatly to the 
public disadvantage, there can be no justification for saying that it is a 
charitable object.59 
 
It has been argued that prior to the enactment of the CA 2006 there was a general 
presumption of the benefit aspect for charitable purposes falling within Macnaghten’s 
first three headings,60 which was removed under s 3(2) CA 2006,61 following 
recommendations by the Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill.62 
 
However, authority on this point is conflicting. For example, in National Anti-
Vivisection Society Lord Wright states: ‘The test of benefit to the community goes 
through the whole of Lord Macnaghten’s classification, though as regards the first 
three heads, it may be prima facie assumed unless the contrary appears.’63 
 
Conversely, in Re Hummeltenberg64 Russell J states: ‘[N]o matter under which of the 
four [heads of charity] a gift may prima facie fall, it is still... necessary…to show…that 
the gift will or may be operative for the public benefit.’65 
  
In the post-CA 2006 case, R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission,66 
the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) held that the courts had not 
recognised purposes falling within Macnaghten’s first three heads as charitable, by 
virtue of the operation of any presumption, prior to the CA 2006.67 
 
Subsequently, in the Attorney General’s second charity law reference, Attorney 
General v Charity Commission (The Poverty Reference),68 the Upper Tribunal (Tax 
and Chancery Chamber) held that there was nothing in case law to cast doubt upon 
the necessity for the requirement of the benefit aspect of charitable purposes. 
Therefore, s 3(2) CA 2006 has had no impact upon whether a purpose is charitable, 
or not.69 
 
This view was also supported in the Government’s response70 to the Public 
Administration Select Committee’s third report of 2013–14,71 which had called for 
Parliament to restore the presumption of public benefit: 
 
The Upper Tribunal made it clear in its judgment on the Independent Schools 
Council case that there had not been a legal presumption of public benefit in 
the case law before the Charities Act 2006. Therefore it would not be possible 
to ‘restore’ a presumption of public benefit that may never have existed.72 
 
Therefore, although, it is argued that s 3(2) CA 2006 introduced a fundamental 
change to the public benefit requirement of charitable purposes,73 essentially, the 
statutory provision did not change the law on the public benefit requirement of 
charitable purposes. It merely sought to clarify the existing case law position with 
regard to the non-existence of any presumption of public benefit for charitable 
purposes falling within Macnaghten’s first three headings.74 
 
The ‘public’ aspect 
The public aspect requires that the charitable purpose must be accessible to the 
public, or to a sufficient section of the public.75 A purpose can be for the benefit of 
the public even if a limited number of people are capable of availing themselves of its 
benefits, or are likely to do so.76 A trust purpose that confers benefits to private 
individuals or to a fluctuating group of private individuals cannot, generally, be 
charitable,77 unless the benefit is no more than incidental to the charitable purpose.78 
 
The distinction between a sufficient section of the public and a fluctuating group of 
private individuals was defined in Re Compton:79 
 
[A] gift under which the beneficiaries are defined by reference to a purely 
personal relationship to a named propositus cannot on principle be a valid 
charitable gift. And this, I think, must be the case whether the relationship be 
near or distant.80 
 
Re Compton was approved in the leading case Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities 
Trust,81 where the majority of the House of Lords (Lord MacDermott dissenting) held 
that a trust for the education of children of employees, however numerous, is a 
private purpose, which the courts and taxpayers should not subsidise. 
 
 In his ratio judgment, Lord Simonds states: 
 
The words ‘section of the community’...indicate first, that the possible 
beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and secondly, that the quality 
which distinguishes them from other members of the community...must be a 
quality which does not depend on their relationship to a particular individual.82 
 
He continues: ‘A group of persons may be numerous but, if the nexus between them 
is their personal relationship to a single propositus or to several propositi, they are 
neither the community nor a section of the community for charitable purposes.’83 
 
Dissenting, Lord MacDermott criticised the ‘personal nexus’ test as inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory in determining, in all cases, whether a trust purpose is sufficiently 
public to qualify as charitable, preferring instead ‘a general survey of the 
circumstances and considerations regarded as relevant rather than of making a 
single, conclusive test’.84 
 
In following Re Compton, Oppenheim confirmed that a trust purpose cannot, 
generally, be charitable where the class of beneficiaries is defined by its relationship, 
personal or contractual.85 However, the House of Lords refrained from considering 
whether the ‘personal nexus’ rule extended to trusts for the relief of poor relations, 
which were considered anomalous to the public aspect of the public benefit 
requirement.86 
 
The poor relations anomaly 
Unlike other trust purposes, trusts for the relief of poor relations can be valid 
charitable purposes,87 provided there are no further restrictions on the class of 
beneficiaries.88 In the Court of Appeal case Re Scarisbrick,89 Lord Jenkins 
distinguished between a trust for the relief of poor relations and a gift to poor 
relatives: 
 
I think the true question in each case has really been whether the gift was for 
the relief of poverty amongst a class of beneficiaries, or rather...was merely a 
gift to individuals, albeit with relief of poverty amongst those individuals as the 
motive of the gift.90 
 
The poor relations anomaly is considered to have stemmed from the Chancery 
practice, in the 19th century, of declaring as charitable, express trusts for poor 
relations, which would otherwise fail for lack of certainty or perpetuity.91 These early 
decisions have been justified by the assumption that they were founded on the 
principle that trusts for the relief of poor relations were considered beneficial to the 
public, generally, owing to their altruistic purposes92(and because they reduce the 
financial burden upon the community93). 
 
In Re Compton, Greene MR surmised that the original decisions in the poor relations 
cases were provided at a time when the public aspect of a charitable gift had not 
been as clearly laid down: 
 
If the question of the validity of gifts of this character had come up for the first 
time in modern days I think that it would very likely have been decided 
 differently on the ground that their purpose was a private family purpose, 
lacking the necessary public character.94 
 
The House of Lords was subsequently presented with an opportunity to consider the 
poor relations cases in the leading case Dingle v Turner.95 In giving his judgment, 
Lord Cross expressly approved Lord MacDermott’s obiter judgment in Oppenheim: 
‘Whether a trust is charitable and for the public benefit involves a general survey of 
all relevant circumstances and considerations rather than the application of a 
dogmatic and inconclusive test.’96 Lord Cross went on to state: 
 
In truth the question whether or not the potential beneficiaries of a trust can 
fairly be said to constitute a section of the public is a question of degree and 
cannot be by itself decisive of the question whether the trust is a charity. Much 
must depend on the purpose of the trust.97 
 
The House of Lords held, unanimously, that it was a natural development for the 
accepted rule on charitable trusts for poor relations to extend to trusts for poor 
employees and poor members of a club or society,98 thus further limiting the scope 
of the personal nexus rule developed in Re Compton and Oppenheim.99 Dingle was 
re-affirmed in Re Segelman:100 ‘a gift for the relief of poverty is no less charitable 
because those whose poverty is to be relieved are confined to a particular class 
limited by ties of blood or employment.’101 
 
Some courts have interpreted the less restrictive public benefit test confirmed in 
Dingle as suggesting that purposes for the relief of poverty are exempt from the 
public benefit requirement. For example, in McGovern, Slade J states: ‘Save in the 
case of gifts to classes of poor persons, a trust must always be shown to promote a 
public benefit of a nature recognised by the courts as being such if it is to qualify as 
being charitable.’102 
 
In following the assertion put forward by Slade J in McGovern, trusts for the relief of 
poor relatives/employees would fall foul of s 4(2) CA 2011;103 conversely, this would, 
arguably, contradict s 4(3) CA 2011.104 
 
This matter was addressed in the Attorney General’s 2012 poverty reference, 
Attorney General v Charity Commission, where the Upper Tribunal held that there 
had not been a presumption that trusts for the relief of poverty were for the public 
benefit, prior to the CA 2006.105 Case law, in fact, had developed different public 
benefit tests for different charitable purposes.106 
 
R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission: the public benefit 
requirement revisited 
The CA 2006107 sought to address the uncertainties regarding public benefit by 
providing that all charitable purposes must satisfy the public benefit requirement108 
as determined under existing charity law,109 and by clarifying the legal position on 
the non-existence of any presumption as to public benefit requirement for charitable 
purposes.110 
 
 Charity lawyer Francesca Quint states that the CA 2006 had ‘brought to the fore the 
fact that the public benefit principle is an essential part of charitable status and that 
no purpose is charitable unless it benefits the public in some way’.111 
 
However, the CA 2006 has been criticised for creating as many uncertainties as it 
sought to rectify.112 In Charities Act ‘critically flawed’ on public benefit,113  the 
chairperson of the Public Administration Select Committee, Bernard Jenkin, MP, 
criticised the Act for creating ambiguity with regard to public benefit and called for the 
public benefit provisions to be repealed. 
 
In R (Independent Schools Council), the Upper Tribunal was provided with an 
opportunity to review the public benefit requirement of charitable purposes in light of 
the enactment of the CA 2006, with particular regard to educational purposes.  
 
The Upper Tribunal held that the CA 2006 had not substantially changed the law 
regarding the public benefit requirement, but had merely clarified the existing 
position: 
 
 [W]hat the 2006 Act has done is to bring into focus what it is that the pre-
existing law already required, and what the law now requires by way of the 
provision of benefit and to whom it must be provided.114  
 
Namely, that the benefits of the educational purposes of independent schools must 
not be outweighed by any detriment arising from the charging of fees,115 and that the 
poor116 must not be expressly excluded from benefiting.117 
 
The Tribunal made it quite clear that the balancing of the public benefit/detriment 
aspect of the educational purposes of independent schools should not be a political 
exercise on the benefits/detriment of private education, generally: 
 
It cannot, we think, be for the Charity Commission or for us or the higher 
courts to carry out what is an essentially political exercise to determine 
whether and if so what, if any disbenefits there are of the private schools 
sector generally and then to balance the benefits and to form a view about 
public benefit.118 
 
The Tribunal went on to state that the ‘allegedly divisive result of private education is 
not to be laid at the door of any particular school’.119 
 
With regard to the second aspect of the public benefit requirement, the non-
exclusion of the poor, the Tribunal acknowledged that there was no existing authority 
supporting the decision that the poor must not be expressly excluded from 
benefiting; it was considered right as a matter of principle, given the underlying 
concept of charity.120 
 
The Tribunal concluded that a charitable independent school would be failing to act 
for the public benefit if it failed to provide adequate benefits for its potential 
beneficiaries other than fee-paying students. Preference should be given to direct 
benefits such as bursaries and fee subsidies, although indirect benefits such as 
access to teaching resources would suffice,121 provided that in all cases there is 
 more than de minimis or token benefit for the poor. It is, however, a matter for the 
trustees (not the Charity Commission or the Tribunal) to decide what is appropriate, 
in their particular circumstances.122 
 
The chief executive of National Council for Voluntary Organisations, Sir Stuart 
Etherington, heralded the decision of the Upper Tribunal as ‘the most significant 
development in charity law for nearly 50 years. It reaffirms that public benefit is the 
cornerstone of charitable law, and sets out how to make this fit for purpose in the 
21st century.’123 However, the Tribunal decision has been criticised as a missed 
opportunity: 
 
[T]he bright line test as to what will amount to sufficient public benefit, and 
what will not, that many hoped the decision would provide was sadly 
absent,124...we are still no closer to understanding truly wherein lies the 
balance between private and public benefit and charitable purpose.125 
 
This criticism, however, seems to place an unrealistic expectation upon the Upper 
Tribunal. Case law has developed different public benefit requirements, depending 
upon the charitable purpose.126 In taking a ‘one test fits all’ approach to public 
benefit, the Upper Tribunal would, arguably, undermine the very intention behind 
s 3(3) CA 2006,127 namely the preservation of the flexibility, inherent in the existing 
case law. As Lord Hodgson observes in Trusted and Independent: Giving charity 
back to charities:128 
 
The flexibility of the case law basis of the existing definition has undoubtedly 
had its benefits over the years, allowing the definition of what is charitable to 
change and develop along with society. This has permitted the evolution of 
the sector in a way that a statutory definition would most likely have been 
unable to.129 
 
In ‘Analysis: the Upper Tribunal decision on fee-charging schools and public 
benefit’,130 Kaye Wiggins argues that the Tribunal decision raises as many questions 
as it answers. Wiggins highlights the fact that, although the Upper Tribunal states 
that the poor must not be excluded from benefiting, it fails to define what would 
constitute more than a de minimis or token benefit for the poor. 
 
Mary Synge expresses similar concerns when she questions the Tribunal’s 
conclusion that trustees must ensure adequate benefits other than the provision of 
education to its fee-paying students: 
 
[I]t seems almost impossible to know what is ‘adequate’ for these purposes. 
An endowed school might be expected to provide more, for example, but it 
cannot be said how much is ‘enough’. A specialist music school might have a 
lower threshold, apparently on the basis that it is more expensive to run and 
because it fulfils a need not generally met by the State.131 
 
These arguments, however, fail to appreciate the point that ‘adequate’, ‘de minimis’ 
and ‘token’ are relative concepts, having a multitude of different meanings, 
depending on the individual independent school’s resources and the needs of its 
 wider community. As stated by the Upper Tribunal, it is a matter for the trustees to 
determine what is appropriate,132 as they are the ones best placed to do so. 
 
Herein, however, may lie a problem. If trustees are to exercise greater judgement in 
the operation of their organisation, the law should be clear, comprehensible and 
supported by effective guidance.133 The CA 2011 undoubtedly provides greater 
clarity on what constitutes charitable purposes134 and on the non-existence of a 
presumption of public benefit.135 However, the CA 2011 does not provide a statutory 
definition of public benefit; instead, public benefit is determined under existing case 
law136 and the guidance published by the Charity Commission.137 
 
Charity lawyer Francesca Quint notes: 
 
[W]hile it was helpful that the Act confirmed that ‘public benefit meant what it 
always meant in charity law’, this was not particularly helpful in defining what it 
did mean, because one then had to work out what charity law said it was.138 
 
The difficulties of interpreting charity law were highlighted in the lengthy and costly 
litigation between the Charity Commission and the Independent Schools Council,139 
which resulted in the Charity Commission withdrawing and rewriting their guidance 
on the public benefit requirements for independent schools. 
 
Phillip Kirkpatrick and Francesca Quint observe that fault did not lie solely with the 
Charity Commission: ‘the Commission was required to produce guidance, which 
reflected centuries and thousands of pages of sometimes contradictory case law’.140 
Nonetheless, ‘the Commission’s original guidance on public benefit did not recognise 
sufficiently the discretion given to trustees to determine how to pursue their 
charitable purposes’.141 
 
Arguably, a statutory definition of what constitutes public benefit would provide 
greater certainty and clarity, giving trustees more confidence in discharging their 
responsibilities,142 while removing the statutory obligation143 on the Charity 
Commission to provide guidance based on their interpretation of vast and complex 
case law. 
 
Conversely, however, the inflexibility of a statutory definition of public benefit would 
hinder innovation and diversity in the charity sector, making it difficult for charities to 
adapt to the changing needs and attitudes of society.144 In the statutory review of the 
CA 2006,145 the overwhelming majority of views received during its consultation 
process supported the flexibility of case law. A statutory definition of public benefit 
was considered too inflexible to accommodate the diversity and complexity of the 
charity sector.146 
 
Despite the legal flaws147 and criticisms148 regarding the Charity Commission’s 
original guidance on public benefit, public consensus arguably favours the flexibility 




 As a means of recognising and supporting the important role charities play within UK 
society,150 Parliament passed the Charities Act 2006 in November 2006, with the aim 
of modernising charity law, which was considered outdated and unclear.151 However, 
the CA 2006 has been heavily criticised for raising as many uncertainties as it sought 
to clarify, particularly with regard to public benefit,152 with some commentators calling 
for a repeal of the statutory provisions on public benefit.153 
 
In the post-CA 2006 case R (Independent Schools Council), the Upper Tribunal 
found that, although the Charity Commission’s original guidance on the public 
requirement for independent schools had been legally flawed,154 the CA 2006 had 
not substantially changed the law regarding public benefit. The CA 2006 had merely 
re-emphasised and re-affirmed the importance of public benefit155 by removing any 
uncertainty regarding the non-existence of a presumption of public benefit, via the 
provisions of s 3(2) CA 2006156 and s 2(1)(b) CA 2006.157 
 
The post-CA 2006 position of the public benefit requirement was also confirmed in 
the Attorney General’s poverty reference of 2012.158 The Upper Tribunal held that 
there had not been a presumption of public benefit for the purposes of the relief of 
poverty prior to the CA 2006;159 case law had developed different public benefit 
requirements, depending on the charitable purpose.160 Therefore, the CA 2006 had 
not fundamentally changed the public benefit requirement for charitable purposes for 
the relief of poverty.161 
 
Arguably, criticism that the CA 2006 placed too much responsibility on the Charity 
Commission to interpret vast and complex case law162 may hold some merit, as seen 
in R (Independent Schools Council). It is, however, debatable as to the extent to 
which fault lay with the Charity Commission.163 Alternatively, a statutory definition of 
public benefit would create certainty and clarity, but this would, undoubtedly, be at 
the price of innovation and diversity within the charity sector.164 
 
In preserving the flexibility of case law as the basis for determining the public benefit 
requirement for charitable purposes, the CA 2006 and its successor, the CA 2011, 
allow the definition of what is charitable to develop in accord with changing social 
needs and attitudes,165 thereby maintaining the spirit and intention behind the 
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